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INTRODUCTION
Health care administrators and public policy makers are currently much con-
cerned with the labor supply of nurses and nursing assistants. Hospitals and nursing
homes, complaining of labor shortages, request public assistance to enable them to
pay higher wages. Before committing public funds, policy makers want up-to-date
estimates of the wage elasticities of labor supply for nurses and nursing assistants.
Constructing a framework within which these elasticities can be estimated requires
consideration of the nature and possible origins of the reported shortages.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Reported shortages
"Shortages,” in various senses, have been reported for decades in U.S. markets
for nurses and nursing assistants. Although this term is used loosely in the non-
economic literature, at least some instances seem to involve persistent excess de-
mand.1 To explain such excess demand in labor markets, economists have often looked
to deviations from perfect competition, most notably employers’ monopsony power,
inflexible relative wages, and incomplete contracts.
Monopsony power
A model of monopsonistic equilibrium in the nursing labor market was intro-
duced by Yett (1970) and extended and applied by Currie et al. (2002), Grosskopf et
al. (1990), Link and Landon (1975), Robinson (1988) and Sullivan (1989). In this
model, a local monopsonist derives its marginal expenditure (ME) function from a
given labor supply function, chooses a quantity of labor to equate its ME with its
marginal revenue product (MRP), and pays just enough to attract this quantity of
labor, given the labor supply curve. The gap between its chosen employment level
and that which would equate its MRP to its chosen wage, as shown in Figure 1, may
be one source of frequent reports of nurse shortages.586 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
FIGURE 1
A Monopsonist Facing a Labor Supply Curve S and Having Marginal
Expenditure Curve ME and Marginal Revenue Product




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































This analysis, with minor modifications, can be extended to oligopsony and monop-
sonistic competition. Indeed, whenever employers face upward sloping labor supply
curves, they have a degree of monopsony power. Evidence that monopsony power, in
various forms, is widespread in labor markets is presented by Bhaskar et al. (2002)
and Manning (2003).
Forms of public assistance often requested by health care providers—e.g., more
generous reimbursement for treating Medicaid patients—could shift MRP schedules
upward. This would typically increase wages and employment without reducing re-
ported shortages. How much employment increased would, of course, depend on the
wage elasticity of supply.
Monopsony power in labor markets is likely to be relatively weak in areas with a
high density of suitable employers. When labor shortages are nonetheless reported
in such areas, other market imperfections are likely responsible. Evidence that monop-
sony power is less than ubiquitous in nursing labor markets and less than adequate
to explain observed outcomes is presented in Hirsch and Schumacher (1995), Hirsch
and Schumacher (2004), and Staiger et al. (1999). Doubts about monopsony power as
an explanation of reported shortages may motivate consideration of two other possi-
bilities: rigidity of relative wages and incomplete contracts.587 LABOR SUPPLY OF NURSES IN THE UNITED STATES
Rigidity of relative wages
The relative wages of employees who work together may be stabilized by consid-
erations of fairness. Persistent wage structures have long been observed in several
industries (Dunlop, 1957; Kim 1999). In the health care sector, Krall notes, adminis-
trators have feared that changes in the customary wage differentials among regis-
tered nurses (RNs), licensed practical nurses (LPNs), and nursing aides, orderlies,
and attendants (NAOAs) could create dissension and undermine cooperation (Krall
1995).
Rigidity of relative wages may help explain reported shortages for some catego-
ries of nurses. Starting from an initial equilibrium in which wages for all categories
of nurses have been independently set at levels that clear each market, suppose that
the MRP curve shifts outward for one group of nurses but inward for another. Em-
ployers may want to raise wages for the former and cut them for the latter but be
deterred by fear of upsetting the customary wage structure. Aversion to wage cuts is
compounded by a belief, widespread among employers, that such cuts hurt morale
and accelerate labor turnover (Bewley 1999). Under these circumstances, the shift-
ing MRP curves are likely to result in excess demand for one group of nurses and
excess supply of the other.
Incomplete contracts
The most recent suggestion for explaining persistent reports of shortage is of-
fered by Heyes (2003), who notes that labor contracts covering nurses are incomplete
in the sense that although a contract may require a nurse to give injections it cannot
effectively require her to give them “with tender loving care” (p. 3). An employer
wanting nurses to go beyond their contractual obligations needs to attract nurses
motivated in part by a sense of vocation rather than simply by pay. Heyes shows
that, under some conditions, raising wages increases the proportion of job applicants
motivated solely by pay. An employer who is unable to observe applicants’ motiva-
tions may prefer to keep wages low, hoping to attract mainly nurses with the desired
sense of vocation.2
While incomplete contracts may explain some persistent shortages, they fail to
explain the cases in which employers not only report a shortage but also seek govern-
ment assistance to enable them to raise wages. In those cases, monopsony and/or
inflexible relative wages may be more relevant.
Wage elasticity of labor supply
The wage elasticity of labor supply is of central interest to employers and policy
makers who wonder how much it would cost to increase employment. Economists
have made many attempts to estimate the elasticity for RNs, LPNs, and NAOAs. A
range of estimates based on U.S. data and published since 1975 are graphically dis-
played in Figure 2. Although the estimates published in the 1970s and 1980s were588 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
widely dispersed, those published in the 1990s are all between 0 and 2, suggesting a
degree of convergence in the literature. Full convergence should not be expected be-
cause studies differ with regard to the type of nurses covered and the length of the
adjustment period covered.
FIGURE  2
Estimates, Based on U.S. Data, of Wage Elasticities of Labor Supply
 for Nurses, as Published between 1975 and 1999
ESTIMATION OF LABOR SUPPLY EQUATIONS
This paper contributes to the literature on the elasticity of labor supply by utiliz-
ing recent extensions of the relevant time series and by using Bayesian methods to
integrate the data with prior information.
Data
Our data are annual time series for 1987–2002 covering full-time employment of
RNs, LPNs, and NAOAs and variables influencing their labor supply. Data on em-
ployment and median weekly earnings of full-time wage and salary workers are an-
nual averages from January issues of the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Employment &
Earnings.3 Data on the civilian labor force come from the same source. Nominal earn-
ings are deflated by the urban Consumer Price Index (base period 1982–84 = 100). Popu-
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Trends in employment and earnings
Employment has trended upward for RNs and NAOAs while rising and then
falling for LPNs; see Figure 3. The fall in LPN employment in the 1990s is probably
due largely to efforts by administrators of hospitals and health maintenance organi-
zations to replace LPNs by NAOAs in less complex tasks and by RNs in more com-
plex ones.
FIGURE 3
Employment of RNs, LPNs, and NAOAs, 1987–2002
If the wages of the three types of nurses were determined independently, we
would expect to see the wages of LPNs dropping relative to those of RNs and NAOAs.
In fact, the earnings of the three groups moved in near parallel, as shown in Figure
4. The nearly parallel movement of the earnings of the three groups is consistent
with the constraints on wage adjustment discussed above in our survey of the litera-
ture.
Specification of labor supply equations
Economic theory and previous studies suggest that the quantity of labor sup-
plied in a particular occupational category, such as RNs, LPNs, or NAOAs, depends
on the real wage in that occupation, real wages in alternative occupations, and the
labor force.
Because changes in these variables take some time to fully affect the quantity of
labor supplied, one or more lagged variables may be needed to capture dynamic
adjustment. Our time series are too short to accommodate rich dynamic specifica-
tions; hence we use a simple partial adjustment model, in which the lagged depen-
dent variable accounts for delayed responses and allows us to estimate long- and
short-run elasticities.
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FIGURE 4
Median Real Earnings of Full-time RNs, LPNs,
And NAOAs, 1987–2002
All variables are used in logarithmic form, allowing us to interpret regression
coefficients as elasticities. In particular, the coefficient of an occupation’s own real
wage can be interpreted as the wage elasticity of supply.
Our labor supply equation can be written as follows:
ln ln ln ln ln Lo w a w f L tt t t t t =+ + + + + − ββ β β β ε 12 3 4 5 1,
where L is full-time employment in an occupation, ow is median real earnings of full-
time workers in the occupation,4 aw is median real earnings of full-time workers in
alternative occupations,5 f is the civilian labor force (with female and male compo-
nents weighted to match the sex-composition of the occupation),  ε is a random dis-
turbance,6 and the subscript denotes time.
Econometric analysis
Our primary interest is in the effect of wage changes on the quantity of labor
supplied; however, to obtain an unbiased estimate of this effect we must also con-
sider how shifts in the labor supply curve affect wages. To this end, we can supple-
ment the labor supply function with either a MRP function or a reduced form wage
equation, the latter including as explanatory variables both factors shifting the labor
supply curve and those shifting the MRP curve. Due to uncertainty about the form of
the MRP function, we prefer to use a reduced form equation. In other words, we opt
for limited rather than full information estimation methods. This choice makes our
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estimates of the labor supply equation relatively robust in the face of uncertainty
about the MRP equation. Our wage equation is specified as follows:
ln ln ln ln ln ow p aw f t t L tt t t t t =+ + + + + + + − ββ β β β β β ε 6 7 8 9 10 11
2
12 1 ,
where p is population with age groups weighted by health care expenditure, t mea-
sures years elapsed since 1987, and the other variables are as defined earlier in
connection with the labor supply curve. The quadratic time trend proxies technologi-
cal change in health care and other omitted variables.7 Comparing the labor supply
and the wage equation, we see that the former is identified by exclusion of ln pt, t, and
t2.
Preliminary efforts to estimate labor supply equations yielded much better fits
for RNs and NAOAs than for LPNs. The reason for this difference, we suspect, is that
employment of the first two groups has been constrained by labor supply while LPNs
have more often in recent years been in excess supply. In other words, employment
provides a good measure of the quantity of labor supplied for RNs and NAOAs but
not for LPNs. To estimate a labor supply curve for an occupation such as LPNs in
which excess supply is common would require far more data than we currently have.
Thus, in what follows we focus on RNs and NAOAs.
Initial estimates of our labor supply function were obtained using a two-stage
least squares (2SLS) estimator. In the first stage, the reduced form wage equation
was estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) and the fitted values of the wage were
saved. In the second stage, the labor supply equation was estimated with the fitted
wage values substituting for the corresponding observed values.
The 2SLS estimates of the labor supply equations for RNs and NAOAs are shown
in Table 1. The numbers to the right of variable names are the corresponding esti-
mated (short-run) elasticities. For example, the estimated wage elasticity of labor
demand for RNs is 0.588 while that for NAOAs is 2.294. The numbers in parentheses
are t-ratios.8
TABLE 1





Own real wage 0.588 2.294
(2.217) (2.548)
Average real wage -0.441 -1.411
(-1.315) (-1.157)
Labor Force 1.665 2.669
(2.754) (1.522)
Lagged dep. var. 0.271 -0.245
(1.010) (-0.292)
R2 0.974 0.839
Breusch-Godfrey F 0.266 0.049
Tail Area for F 0.620 0.830592 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
The 2SLS estimates have several attractive features. The summary statistics at
the bottom of the table are indicative of a good fit without significant serial correla-
tion. The signs of the estimated coefficients of the current variables are all as ex-
pected. The magnitudes of the estimated own wage elasticities are consistent with
results from previous studies. The difference between the own wage elasticities for
RNs and NAOAs is consistent with the fact that RNs are more specialized and firmly
attached to their occupation than are NAOAs.
Nonetheless, the 2SLS estimates are not fully satisfactory. The labor force elas-
ticities are implausibly high. The negative sign of the estimated coefficient of the
lagged dependent variable for NAOAs is contrary to theoretical expectations. The
low precision of the estimated coefficients of the lagged dependent variables in both
equations precludes any reliable inferences about long-run elasticities. Contributing
to the implausible and imprecise estimates is severe collinearity among the regres-
sors, which is not surprising when we consider that all the regressors trend upward.9
To narrow the range of the uncertainty about the short- and long-run elasticities,
we can supplement the sample evidence with prior information derived from eco-
nomic theory and previous empirical studies. Techniques for combining sample and
prior information are provided by Bayesian statistics, a field that has developed rap-
idly over the last fifteen years as the cost of computer simulation has dropped (Gelman
et al. 2004; Koop 2003; Lancaster 2004).
Researchers and various members of their audience often have different back-
ground information. Prior information that is widely if not universally shared is em-
ployed in the remainder of this section. Readers with different beliefs or more de-
tailed information are offered simulation files that can be easily reanalyzed from
various points of view.
Based on economic theory and previous studies, we may reasonably suppose that
an increase in RNs' or NAOAs' own wages increases the quantity of labor supplied to
the occupation (β2>0), an increase in wages in alternative occupations decreases the
labor supply to nursing (β3<0), an increase in the labor force increases the supply of
nurses roughly proportionately (0<β4<2), and the adjustment of labor supply to changes
in its determinants is only partially completed within a year (0<β5<1). With regard to
the reduced form wage equation, we believe that an increase in the population (with
age groups weighted by health care expenditure) increases demand for nurses and
hence their wages (β7>0), but an increase in the labor force increases the supply of
nurses and thus depresses their wages (β9<0).
The prior information indicated in the previous paragraph is combined with the
sample evidence in two steps. First, Bayesian estimates are calculated using the
sample and a diffuse (uninformative) prior distribution for the parameters.10 Com-
puter simulation methods are used to draw a large sample from the posterior (post-
data) distribution of the parameters.11 From this simulated sample, summary statis-
tics such as means and standard errors are easily calculated. These preliminary Baye-
sian estimates are much like the 2SLS estimates shown in Table 1. Second, the in-
equality constraints specified in the previous paragraph are imposed by discarding
elements of the simulated sample that violate them. From the accepted elements,
summary statistics can again be calculated. Posterior means and t-statistics based593 LABOR SUPPLY OF NURSES IN THE UNITED STATES
on the informative prior distribution are shown in Table 2. The posterior means for
the short-run own wage elasticities (β2) are 0.654 for RNs and 1.572 for NAOAs.
TABLE 2
Bayesian Posterior Means and T-statistics





Own real wage 0.654 1.572
(2.065) 1.550)
Average real wage -0.488 -1.073
(-1.790) (-1.095)
Labor force 1.415 1.328
(3.512) (2.719)
Lagged dep. var 0.386 0.388
(2.081) (1.595)
Posterior distributions, particularly those involving inequality constraints, may
be asymmetric, making means and t-statistics less useful than quantiles and graphi-
cal summaries. Quantiles of the posterior distributions of the parameters are shown
in Table 3 for RNs and Table 4 for NAOAs. The interpretation of these tables can be
illustrated by focusing on the line in Table 3 for the own real wage. This line indi-
cates, inter alia, that the median of the posterior distribution for the coefficient of the
own real wage (β2) is .6436 for RNs, there is a 90 percent posterior probability that β2
exceeds .2607, and the 90 percent central credible interval is (.1691, 1.2383). The fact
that the gap between the .05 quantile and the median is smaller than the gap be-
tween the median and the .95 quantile is indicative of a rightward skew in the distri-
bution. Comparing the entries for own real wage in Tables 3 and 4, we see that each
quantile for NAOAs is greater than the corresponding quantile for RNs, consistent
with NAOAs’ weaker occupational attachment. The posterior medians for the long-
run elasticities are 1.058 for RNs and 1.901 for NAOAs.12 The central 90 percent
credible intervals for the long-run elasticities are (0.2535, 3.3378) for RNs and (0.5528,
10.703) for NAOAs.
TABLE  3
Quantiles of the Posterior Distribution of Parameters
of the Labor Supply Equation for RNs, 1988–2002
.05 .10 .50 .90 .95
Intercept -8.2439 -7.8885 -6.1808 -3.6837 -2.9060
Own real wage 0.1691 0.2607 0.6436 1.0809 1.2383
Average real wage -1.0189 -0.8783 -0.4682 -0.1356 -0.0719
Labor force 0.5991 0.8067 1.4644 1.8893 1.9459
Lagged dep. var. 0.1269 0.1680 0.3713 0.6666 0.7568
Posterior probability density functions (PDFs) for RNs' short-run own wage elas-
ticity, based on diffuse and informative prior distributions, are shown in Figure 5. In594 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
TABLE  4
Quantiles of the Posterior Distribution of Parameters of
the Labor Supply Equation for NAOAs, 1988–2002
0.05 0.10 0.50 0.90 0.95
Intercept -7.6426 -7.3027 -5.1345 -1.6878 -0.7122
Own real wage 0.3425 0.4854 1.1349 2.2342 2.6712
Average real wage -2.3491 -1.9145 -0.6751 -0.1198 -0.0580
Labor force 0.3469 0.5911 1.4086 1.8824 1.9436
Lagged dep. var. 0.0703 0.1134 0.3655 0.7575 0.8454
FIGURE 5
Posterior Probability Density Functions for the Short-run
Wage Elasticity of Labor Supply for RNs Based
on Diffuse (D) and Informative (I) Priors.
both cases, the mode of the function is near .5. As expected, the PDF is more tightly
concentrated around the mode in the case of the informative prior distribution.
Posterior PDFs for NAOAs’ short-run own wage elasticity are shown in Figure 6.
The mode for the function based on a diffuse prior distribution is slightly less than
one while the mode based on the informative distribution is slightly greater than
one. The major difference, however, is that the former distribution has a long left tail
while the latter does not.
Posterior PDFs for RNs’ long-run own wage elasticity, based on diffuse and infor-
mative priors, are shown in Figure 7. Both modes are slightly less than one. The PDF
based on the informative prior, compared to that based on the diffuse prior, is shifted
slightly to the right and has a truncated left tail.
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FIGURE 6
Posterior Probability Density Functions for the Short-run
Wage Elasticity of Labor Supply for NAOAs Based on
Diffuse (D) and Informative (I) Priors.
Posterior PDFs for NAOAs’ long-run own wage elasticity are shown in Figure 8.
The mode based on the diffuse prior is slightly less than one while that based on the
informative prior is slightly less than two. The PDF based on the informative prior,
compared to that based on the diffuse prior, is shifted substantially to the right and
is truncated on the left.
Readers interested in combining the data evidence with their own prior infor-
mation or in deriving the posterior distribution of functions (of parameters) not
discussed here may download simulation files that can be easily reanalyzed. These
contain draws from the posterior distribution of model parameters based on a dif-
fuse prior distribution. The file for RNs, RNmi1.bin, contains 5,000 draws while
that for NAOAs, NAOAmi1.bin, contains 50,000.13 An example of Matlab code to
reanalyze these simulation files is given in client.m.14 These files are available at
http://www.uri.edu/artsci/ecn/burkett/nurses.htm.
CONCLUSIONS
In U.S. markets for nurses and nursing assistants, there have been frequent re-
ports of “shortages,” some of which involve excess demand attributable to monopsony
power, inflexible relative wages, or incomplete contracts. Recent trends in employ-
ment and wages data suggest that excess demand for RNs and NAOAs may coexist
with excess supply of LPNs.
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FIGURE 7
Posterior Probability Density Functions for the Long Run
Wage Elasticity of Labor Supply for RNs Based on
Diffuse (D) and Informative (I) Priors.
FIGURE 8
Posterior Probability Density Functions for the Long Run
Wage Elasticity of Labor Supply for NAOAs Based on
Diffuse (D) and Informative (I) Priors.
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Based on annual time-series data for the United States, 1988–2002, we have
derived posterior distributions for short- and long-run own wage elasticities of labor
supply by RNs and NAOAs. The median of the distribution for the short-run elastic-
ity is .644 for RNs and 1.135 for NAOAs. The central 90 percent posterior credible
interval for the short-run elasticity is (.169, 1.238) for RNs and (.343, 2.671) for NAOAs.
The median of the distribution for the long-run elasticity is 1.058 for RNs and 1.901
for NAOAs. The central 90 percent credible interval for the long-run elasticity is
(0.254, 3.338) for RNs and (0.553, 10.703) for NAOAs.
This analysis suggests that increased public assistance to health care providers,
designed to raise wages, probably would not reduce reported shortages arising from
monopsony power but would nonetheless appreciably increase employment of RNs
and NAOAs.
Policy makers considering possible initiatives to increase employment of nurses
and nursing aides should of course consider spatial and individual heterogeneity,
which is lost from view in the aggregate data analyzed here. A data set on individual
workers, including information on their employers and communities, would certainly
afford opportunities for a richer analysis.
NOTES
The author is grateful to the Rhode Island Department of Human Services for research funding, to
Matthew Bodah and Leonard Lardaro for discussion of labor supply issues, to John Geweke, William
McCausland, and John Stevens for advice about BACC software, and to Susan Averett, Marsha
Goldfarb, and Anthony Lancaster for comments on an earlier draft.
1. In the non-economic literature “shortage” sometimes means scarcity rather than excess demand.
2. Professors as well as nurses work under incomplete contracts. Because Heyes’s model could be used to
justify holding down their salaries, professors stand to gain financially from it being discredited in the
eyes of university administrators. However, any professor who refutes it risks appearing mercenary.
This conflict between group and individual interests might be called a professor’s dilemma were it not
already named for prisoners.
3. Because the employment data are annual averages for full-time workers, a person working full-time
for a fraction of a year counts as that fraction of a worker. For example, two individuals each working
half a year would together count as one year-round worker in the annual average.
4. The wage rate, were it observed, would be preferable to earnings as a regressor. However, median
earnings of full-time workers probably are strongly correlated with the wage rate because use of the
median diminishes the impact of fluctuations in overtime hours and the restriction to full-time work-
ers eliminates the effects of fluctuations in part-time hours.
5. Although ow and aw are measured as median earnings of full-time employees, we will for brevity
sometimes call them wages.
6. The disturbance includes the effect of variables such as unearned income that are excluded from the
list of regressors for want of suitable time series. As a proxy for trending unobserved variables, a time
trend was tried as an additional regressor. The estimated coefficient of the time trend in two-stage
least squares estimation was not significantly different from 0 at the .10 level. The time trend was
omitted from the final specification to conserve degrees of freedom.
7. Capital might be either a complement or a substitute for nurses. As a proxy for the price of capital, the
real interest rate was tried as an additional regressor. Its estimated coefficient was not significantly
different from zero, suggesting that capital is on the border line between a complement and a substi-
tute. Health insurance coverage was also considered as a possible regressor; however, data for insur-
ance in 2002 were unavailable.598 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
8. For readers concerned about the interpretation of the t-ratios in a time series context, two points
should be noted. First, the employment series are more likely to be trend stationary than difference
stationary, as shown in an appendix that is available from the author. Second, in either case, the t-
ratios and the standard tables of the t distribution are valid indicators of the shape of the likelihood
function, which is arguably of greater substantive interest than the sampling-theory distribution of
estimators (Sims 1988; Sims and Uhlig 1991). Similarly, the Bayesian estimates reported below are
valid summaries of the posterior distribution of the parameters regardless of whether employment is
difference stationary or trend stationary.
9. Collinearity in our labor supply equations was diagnosed using scaled condition indices and variance
decomposition proportions as proposed by Belsley (1991) and summarized by Hill and Adkins (2001).
Supplemental regressions show that ln owt and ln awt are closely related, as are ln ft and  ln Lt-1.
10. While diffuse, the prior distribution is proper (integrates to one). The prior used here is centered at
zero and has a standard deviation of 100 for each parameter.
11. The simulation is done using Bayesian Analysis, Computation, and Communication (BACC) software.
BACC is described in Geweke et al. (2003) and freely available at http://www2.cirano.qc.ca/~bacc/.
12. The long-run elasticity is β2/(1-β5). The posterior distribution of this function of the parameters was
explored by numerical simulation. The posterior sample consists of all draws that satisfy all the prior
inequalities. Each draw includes an estimate of β2 and β5, say b2 and b5. For each draw in the posterior
sample, b2/(1- b5) was calculated. The posterior median for the long-run elasticity is estimated by the
median of these values of b2/(1- b5).
13. A larger number of draws were made for NAOAs because more are rejected by our inequality con-
straints.
14. This code calls on routines contained in BACC, which can be obtained from http://www2.cirano.qc.ca/~bacc/.
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